In the past 40 years, a global shift has taken place towards a constellation of values known as “expansive values”, which de-emphasize pursuits of money, possessions, and status, and instead focus on quality of life and humanistic goals. This study investigated what students holding expansive values desired in business school course content and student quality of life, and how these preferences differed from students holding materialistic values. Results revealed a number of different factors that were associated only with expansive values, (...) though on a few factors the two student values cohorts shared similar preferences or had inverse preferences. One clear implication of this study is that business schools need to consider offering more ethics classes in order to satisfy the growing number of students with expansive values. (shrink)

It is my hope that the book will be widely read and debated."--Axel Leijonhufvud, UCLA and the University of Trento "This is a major and controversial contribution to macroeconomics that cannot fail to make an impact in several areas.

This article asserts that traditionally dominant models of health promotion in the US are fairly characterized by methodological individualism. This schema produces a focus on the individual as the node of intervention. Such emphasis results in a number of scientific and ethical problems. I identify three principal ethical deficiencies: first, the health promotions used are generally ineffective, which violates canons of distributive justice because scarce health resources are expended on interventions that are unlikely to produce health benefits. Second, the health (...) promotions used tend to expand health inequalities between the affluent and the least well-off. Third, the health promotions used are likely to intensify stigma against the least well-off, a deficiency that itself may exacerbate the ‘densely-woven patterns of disadvantage’ that characterize life on the tail of the social gradient. Because Powers and Faden’s health sufficiency model of social justice argues that the amelioration of such clusters of disadvantage should be the primary ethical goal of public health policy, methodologically individualist models of health promotion are ethically deficient and should not stand as primary approaches for health promotion in a just social order. (shrink)

This volume is a collection of essays by various contributors in honor of the late Laurence Berns, Richard Hammond Elliot Tutor Emeritus at St. John's College, Annapolis. The essays address the literary, political, theological, and philosophical themes of his life's work as a scholar, teacher, and constant companion of the "great books.".

Twenty-five years after the term "therapeutic misconception’ (TM) first entered the literature, most commentators agree that it remains widespread. However, the majority of scholarly attention has focused on the reasons why a patient cum human subject might confuse the goals of research with the goals of therapy. Although this paper addresses the social and cultural factors that seem to animate the TM among subjects, it also fills a niche in the literature by examining why investigators too might operate under a (...) similar confusion. In framing these issues, the paper expressly adopts a Wittgensteinian approach to evaluating the TM, suggesting that interlocutors do not need any analytic definition of the TM to use the term meaningfully in thinking about the moral implications of the TM in practice. (shrink)

The medical biography of Ludwig van Beethoven remains enigmatic. Some of his health problems, such as his early and eventually profound deafness, are well documented and extensively discussed, although not necessarily well explained . Other medical problems, and his ultimate cause of death, remain unclear. Perhaps unsurprisingly for such an important musical figure, there has been no dearth of speculation about the illnesses that may have befallen Beethoven. Medical historians and physicians have suggested a myriad of illnesses, including but hardly (...) limited to .. (shrink)

This note focuses on George Soros's challenge to macroeconomics and finance theory that any valid methodology of social science must explicitly recognize fallibility in a Knightian sense. We use a simple algebraic example to sketch how extant models formalize fallibility. We argue that contemporary theory's epistemological and empirical difficulties can be traced to assuming away fallibility in a Knightian sense. We also discuss how imperfect knowledge economics provides a way to open mathematical models to such fallibility, while preserving economics as (...) an empirical science. (shrink)

Corresponding Author, Health Policy & Ethics Fellow, Chronic Disease Prevention & Control Research Center, Department of Medicine, Baylor College of Medicine, 1709 Dryden, Suite 1025, Houston, TX 77030, USA. Tel.: 713.798.5482; Fax: 713 798 3990; Email: danielg{at}bcm.edu ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> . Abstract This article defends a broad model of public health, one that specifically addresses the social epidemiologic research suggesting that social conditions are primary determinants of health. The article proceeds by critiquing one (...) of the strongest arguments in favor of a narrow model, advanced by Mark Rothstein. The critique sets up the argument that a model of public health that does not address what actually causes health and disease is unlikely to improve public health. Assessing the substantial evidence regarding the social determinants of health, the article engages the policy paradox that precludes utopian prescriptions but demands more than mere expedience. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Davidson's argument equivocates on the term "physical": the physical events that mental events cause might not be subsumed under laws.

RésuméLa parution récente du troisième recueil d'articles de Donald Davidson, lequel devrait être suivi de deux autres, incite à examiner les thèmes qui traversent tousses travaux. Parmices thèmes se trouve leprincipe de charité. Considerant tout le parti que Davidson a tiré du PC, je me propose d'en faire un examen attentif. Dans la première partie, j'examine diverses formulations du PC par Davidson. Dans la seconde partie, je montre que la formulation qu'exigent ses travaux d'epistémologie est intenable étant donné ce qu'il (...) en dit dans ses travaux de sémantique. De là, je conclus que Davidson ne peut se servir du PC que dans ses travaux de sémantique ou pas du tout. (shrink)

Autant que la position de la femme dans la société, le principe de la matrilinéarité juive est révélateur des normes qui régissent le lien social. Le système de filiation matrilinéaire s’est installé dans le judaïsme sur la base de l’interprétation du dit talmudique affirmant Ton fils né d’une idolâtre n’est pas ton fils mais le sien (Qid. 68b). Il entérinait un processus enclenché quelques siècles plus tôt, à l’époque de la Mishna, autour du premier siècle de l’ère, mettant un terme (...) à la longue tradition biblique qui ne percevait de filiation que patrilinéaire, et instaurait, ce faisant, un modèle de transmission de la judéité qui perdure jusqu’à nos jours. Cette transformation majeure était-elle due à une évolution interne de la pensée rabbinique rationalisant la judéité au regard des affiliations? Ou à des contraintes extérieures liées à l’imposition de nouvelles réglementations du statut de la personne? Les deux hypothèses d’interprétations sont débattues – et parfois se rejoignent – dans les recherches menées sur la filiation ou l’identité juive. Cet article examine les conditions de la transmission de l’identité de la personne, telles qu’elles ont été traitées et définies au long des siècles par l’institution de normes juridiques et sociales régulant la filiation, la conversion et l’héritage, toutes normes qui éclairent les évolutions du statut de la femme dans l’histoire du judaïsme entre l’Antiquité tardive et le Moyen Âge. (shrink)

A. D. M. Walker; III*—Gratefulness and Gratitude, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 39–56, https://doi.org/10.1093.

The Problem of Perception offers two arguments against direct realism--one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination--that no current theory of ...

First published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In this paper I want to examine a view of the Darwinian theory of evolution which was put forward fairly recently by A. R. Manser. His approach is of interest not only in itself, but also because it may be expanded to raise some fundamental questions about the nature of the science of biology in general. I shall not consider these further implications here, but shall concentrate on an examination of his thesis in the context in which it is raised. (...) My paper falls into two sections. In the first I shall state Manser's thesis and some of the arguments with which he supports it, and shall try to show how a series of objections raised by A. G. N. Flew and K. Connolly may be answered. In the second I shall offer on my own account a positive argument to provide a possible basis for his point of view, with the aim of indicating why the theory should be of the kind he suggests, and what form the study of evolution must take. (shrink)

There are many possible ways of approach to philosophy, and there is also an impossible one, though one that has often been tried. That the philosopher can somehow spin his philosophy out of what he finds inside himself; that he has some private internal source of information in virtue of which he can decide what the Universe must be, without needing to take the trouble to look at it, is a belief that dies hard. But it is now dying, if (...) not dead, so that it is hardly necessary to refute it in detail. It should suffice to say that anybody who cherishes the belief will not find anything to interest him in what follows. I shall simply assume that the philosopher is, what we all are to some extent, a spectator of the world and of man's life in it and a commentator on what he sees. Where the philosopher differs from others is in the kind of interest he takes in the facts, not in the kind of facts that are there to be interested in. (shrink)

The paper examines a single, apparently simple argument for the existence of incompatibilities between the virtues as traits of character. This argument appeals not to empirical truths about human psychology or human nature but to the possibility of conflict between the exercise of different virtues in action. There are, for example, situations in which we can exercise the virtue of truthfulness only at the expense of not exercising the virtue of tact, as when we are asked a question to which (...) the straightforward answer will pain our questioner. The person who in these situations would give a straightforward answer possesses the virtue of truthfulness to a higher degree than the person who would respond more evasively, whereas the latter person possesses the virtue of tact to a higher degree than the former. But since the two responses are mutually exclusive, it follows that the degree to which we possess the virtue of truthfulness must, at least in some measure, correlate inversely with the degree to which we possess the virtue of tact. And similarly for many other pairs of virtues. My paper focusses on the two cardinal assumptions of this argument, viz., (i) that sometimes the exercise of one virtue can conflict with the exercise of another, and (ii) that the degree to which a person possesses a virtue correlates directly with the extent of its exercise, and defends both assumptions against a variety of objections which allege that, in different ways, they are insensitive to the complexity of the virtues. (shrink)